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ANTITRUST-Goldfarb v. Virginia State BarProfessional Legal Services Are Held To Be
Within the Ambit of Federal Antitrust Laws.
The one great principle of the English law is, to make business
for itself. There is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently maintained through all its narrow turnings. Viewed by
this light it becomes a coherent scheme, and not the monstrous
maze the laity are apt to think it. Let them but once clearly perceive that its grand principle is to make business for itself at their
expense, and surely they will cease to grumble.'
INTRODUCTION

In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2 the United States Supreme
Court held that the minimum fee schedule published by the Fairfax
3
County Bar Association and enforced by the Virginia State Bar
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.4 The Court, abandoning the
historical presumption that the workings of the legal profession are
immune from federal antitrust attack,5 termed the promulgation
and enforcement of the fee schedule "a classic illustration of price
fixing,"' a per se violation of the Sherman Act. More significantly
the Court ruled that interstate commerce had been affected and
1. C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE, CH. XXXIX (1853).
2. 95 S.Ct. 2004 (1975). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
all other members joined except Mr. Justice Powell, who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
3. The Virginia State Bar is authorized by the Virginia Supreme Court pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. §54-49 (1974) to render advisory opinions on contemplated professional conduct.
In Opinion 98, issued June 1, 1960, and Opinion 170, issued May 28, 1971, the Virginia State
Bar indicated that an attorney's habitual disregard of the minimum fee schedules of local
bar associations might result in disciplinary proceedings. These opinions were supplemented
by the State Bar's publication "Minimum Fee Schedule Report" which was issued to local
bar associations as a guide for establishing minimum fee schedules. See Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 355 F.Supp. 491, 498-99 (E.D.Va. 1973). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) as adopted by the Supreme Court, 211 Va. 295,
313 (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970) provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is
declared to be illegal ....
5. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922); Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S.
643, 653 (1931); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 429 (1932);
Note, Antitrust Law: An Application of the Sherman Act to the Professions, 25 U. FLA. L.
REv. 740, 750-53 (1973).
6. 95 S.Ct. at 2011.
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that lawyers engage in interstate commerce. Chief Justice Burger
noted, "it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an
important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive
activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on commerce. 7 . Addressing the issue of whether the Virginia State Bar was exempt from
liability under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown,8 the
Court held that the State Bar "voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity." 9 Thus, absent statutory
command or administrative directive requiring fee schedules, the
bar association was not exempt from federal antitrust laws.'"
BACKGROUND

The case arose when Lewis and Ruth Goldfarb, unable to obtain
legal services below the minimum fixed fees of the local bar associations," challenged the fee schedules in an antitrust class action
against the Virginia State Bar and the Fairfax County Bar Association.'" The Goldfarbs alleged, inter alia, that the adoption and enforcement of minimum fee schedules constituted price fixing and a
conspiracy in restraint of trade.'3 Representing a class of persons
who had purchased homes in the Northern Virginia area within the
previous four years and had paid for title examinations by lawyers
in accordance with the applicable fee schedules,' 4 the plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages
under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 5 Since a title search was a
7. Id. at 2014.
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See text accompanying notes 104 through 121 infra.
9. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2015 (1975).
10. Id. at 2014-16.
11. The Goldfarbs sent letters to 36 attorneys requesting a fee quote for a title examination. Nineteen responded indicating that their charge was based on the minimum fee schedules promulgated by the local bar associations. Id. at 2007.
12. Also named as co-defendants at the trial level were the Arlington County Bar Association and the Alexandria Bar Association both of whom subsequently agreed to consent judgments requiring the cancellation of their minimum fee schedules and a permanent injunction
against publication of future fee schedules. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F.Supp. 491,
492 n.1 (E.D.Va. 1973).
13. 95 S.Ct. at 2008.
14. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F.Supp. 491, 499 (E.D.Va. 1973). The court stated
that the fee for title examination recommended in the MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE of the Fairfax
County Bar Association is "one percent of the first $50,000 of the loan amount or purchase
price and one half of one percent of the loan amount or purchase price from $50,000 to
$250,000." Id. at 493 n.3.
15. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides . . . without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
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necessary cost of a real estate transaction,' 6 the Goldfarbs argued
that the fixed fees charged by attorneys operated to inflate artificially the market price of homes and create an unnecessary burden
on consumers in the Northern Virginia area.' 7
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, 8 the issue of damages was severed and the case was tried
on the issue of the defendants' liability. The district court concluded
that the activities of the Virginia State Bar and the Fairfax County
Bar Association in publishing and enforcing the minimum fee
schedules amounted to price fixing.'" The court found a sufficient
effect on interstate commerce to sustain federal jurisdiction 2 and
ruled that there is no basis for an implied exemption from antitrust
laws for the legal profession. 2' The district court held the Fairfax
County Bar Association liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act
for promulgating the minimum fee schedules, but dismissed the
Virginia State Bar,2 finding its activities immune from antitrust
2
challenge under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown. 1
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
See generally 15 U.S.C. §26 (1970) which provides for injunctive relief.
16. The mortgagee requires title insurance which can only be secured after the title is
examined. This service must be performed by a member of the Virginia State Bar. See
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2007 n.1, citing Unauthorized Practiceof Law
Opinion No. 17, August 5, 1942, VRGINIA STATE BAR-OPINIONS 239 (1965).
17. 95 S.Ct. at 2010.
18. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F.Supp. 491 (E.D.Va. 1973). This decision sparked
a storm of controversy and commentary. One day after the Goldfarb decision, the Justice
Department filed an antitrust suit against the Oregon State Bar for similar activity. Judge
Sharp did not exempt the state bar on either the "learned profession" immunity or the "state
action" exemption under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See United
States v. Oregon State Bar, 385 F.Supp. 507 (D. Ore. 1974); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules: An Antitrust Problem, 48 TuL. L. REv. 682 (1974); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules
v. Antitrust: The Goldfarb Affair, 45 Miss. L.J. 162 (1974).
19. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F.Supp. 491, 493-94 (E.D. Va. 1973).
20. Id. at 494. Jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is based on the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution, art. 1, §8, which provides:
The Congress shall have Power. . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States ....
21. 355 F. Supp. at 493-94. Antitrust exemptions are rare. Baseball, for example, was
exempted by case law in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), and reaffirmed in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972), but the Court there felt that baseball was indeed in interstate commerce although
entitled to the benefit of stare decisis. Id. at 282. Other sports have not fared so well. See,
e.g., International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). Other activities exempted in whole or in part, by statute
or case law, include labor unions, air carriers, insurance conglomerates and trade
organizations. See also Branca, Bar Association Fee Schedules and Suggested Alternatives:
Reflections on a Sherman Exemption that Doesn't Exist, 3 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 207 (1974).
22. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F.Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Va. 1973).
23. 317 U.S. 431 (1943). See text accompanying notes 104 through 121 infra.
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The Fourth Circuit reversed 2' the district court's application of
the Sherman Act to the County Bar's adoption and publication of
the fee schedules and affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the
Virginia State Bar falls within the parameters of the state action
exemption. 5 The court of appeals held that the "learned professions" do not engage in trade or commerce, and that the nexus
between the professional activities of lawyers and interstate commerce is too remote and indirect to sustain jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act.2" In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Craven would have affirmed the dismissal of the Virginia State Bar.
However, he could find no exemption for the legal profession under
federal antitrust laws and stated that the minimum fee schedule
sufficiently affected interstate commerce transactions to fall under
the Sherman Act. 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.28 The issues
before the Court were fourfold: (1) whether the Fairfax County Bar's
minimum fee schedule constituted price fixing; (2) whether a minimum fee schedule published by the local bar association was exempt from liability for price fixing under the Sherman Act on the
ground that the restraint on competition was among members of a
"learned profession;" (3) whether interstate commerce was affected
by fixed fees in connection with the purchase of real estate in Northern Virginia; and (4) whether the Virginia State Bar was immune
from attack under the Sherman Act for its role in the establishment
and enforcement of minimum fee schedules under the "state action" exemption of Parker v. Brown."9
ATTORNEYS' FEE SCHEDULES AS PRICE FIXING

The first question the Supreme Court considered was whether the
minimum fee schedule published and distributed by the Fairfax
County Bar Association amounted to a price fixing agreement in
restraint of free trade and commerce.3 0 The County Bar contended
24. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id. at 18-19. Finding that the activities of lawyers do not affect interstate commerce
defeats jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws. Arguably the Fourth Circuit's conclusions on the "learned profession" immunity and the "state action" exemption are dicta.
27. Id. at 22 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting). See also Note, Bar Association
Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1164.
28. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 419 U.S. 963 (1975). For a reproduction of the Brief
submitted by the United States as Amicus Curiae urging that certiorari be granted, see BNA
ANTrrRUST

& TRADE

REG. REP.,

No. 686, at F-1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief for United

States as Amicus Curiae].
29. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
30. 95 S.Ct. at 2010. See generally Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished,
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that the fee schedule was merely a unilateral attempt to disseminate legitimate price information for its members consideration.,
The conscious design of the minimum fee schedule, the County Bar
argued, was to assist the attorney in complying with the Virginia
State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 98 and Opinion
No. 170 which were designed to insure compliance with the disciplinary rules of the Virginia Supreme Court. 3 Absent these ethical
considerations, the Fairfax County Bar Association insisted it would
not have promulgated the "suggested" fee schedule.3 In Sherman
Act litigation, the Supreme Court has developed two theories for
approaching the challenged activity: the "rule of reason" approach
and the per se rule.3 Under the traditional rule of reason, 3 whether
or not a given system of associations and activities constitutes a
restraint on trade depends in large measure on its direct and immediate effect on the public interest.36 Where the objective is the suppression of competition in interstate commerce or the artificial inflation of costs affecting interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
has not had difficulty in concluding that the Sherman Act has been
57 A.B.A.J. 655 (1971); Note, Antitrust Violation: Minimum Bar Fees-Goldfarbv. Virginia
State Bar, 10 IDAHo L. REv. 257 (1974); Note, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and
the Antitrust Laws, supra note 27; Note, The Wisconsin Fee Schedule: A Problem of
Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1237; Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules-the Battle and the
War: Goldfarb at the Fourth Circuit, 60 VA. L. REv. 1415 (1974).
31. The viability of bar associations disseminating price information as an alternative to
the fixed minimum fee schedule was explored in Note, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust Laws, supra note 27, at 1167-74. In Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), the Supreme Court reviewed a scheme
whereby the Maple Flooring Association, a group of twenty-two leading corporations in the
Midwest, had agreed to compile and distribute information as to their average production
cost, past selling history, raw material quotes, and percentages of industrial waste. The Court
applied the rule of reason analysis and held that these activities in themselves do not constitute an illegal restraint of trade under the antitrust laws absent a showing that the information provided a basis for subsequent agreement to "lessen production arbitrarily or to raise
prices beyond the levels of production and price." Id. at 585. See generally Arnould, Pricing
ProfessionalServices: A Case Study of the Legal Service Industry, 38 So. ECON. J. 495, 499502 (1972).
32. 95 S.Ct. at 2010.
33. Id. See, e.g., Morgan, Where Do We Go from Here with Fee Schedules?, 59 A.B.A.J.
1403 (1973). See also Walsh, President'sPage, 61 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1975).
34. See Montague, "Per Se" Illegality: and the Rule of Reason, 12 ABA ANTITRUST L.J.
69 (1958).
35. The notion that only unreasonablerestraint of trade violates section 1 was first suggested in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The rule of reason
was more fully developed in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
36. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913).
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violated. 7 Where, however, the public interest in an unrestricted
market economy is not unreasonably compromised, the Supreme
Court has expanded its scope of inquiry to include considerations
of purpose and motivation as well as mitigating factors such as the
public's benefit from a particular industry's economic stability. 8
The rule of reason analysis has frequently been applied in situations where a trade association, without express agreement among
its members, took unilateral action to promote the industry's interests.3 Where the record is devoid of any fact establishing an agreement, purpose, or intention on the part of an association to influence
price levels or control production of the industry at large, the Supreme Court has concluded that legitimate business interests justify
some slight restraint on the economy where the public is not unduly
prejudiced. 0 The Sherman Act under the rule of reason may allow
members of an association who act purposefully and without agreement to foster their own particular interests."
In contrast, where the concerted efforts of businessmen in a particular industry affect price structure or market forces, the per'se
37. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); United States v. Container
Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
38. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
39. Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
40. Id. But see United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
In that case the defendants who accounted for nearly 90 percent of the corrugated container
sales in Southeastern United States employed an exchange of price information system to
stabilize prices. The Court held that this activity raised an inference of an agreement to fix
prices in restraint of trade. In reaching its result, the Court suggested that while the exchange
of price information in some markets may have little effect on the price, in other markets
the exchange may amount to a per se price fixing agreement where the "exchange of price
information has had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of price
competition." Id. at 337. The Supreme Court in Goldfarb found the minimum fee schedule a
price fixing arrangement without the necessity of drawing this inference. However, Container
Corporation may serve as a basis for attack on "suggested" minimum fee schedules where a
substantial effect can be shown on the legal industry to the point of stifling price competition.
41. Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 583-85
(1925).
Competition does not become less free merely because the conduct of commercial
operations becomes more intelligent through the free distribution of knowledge of
all the essential factors entering into the commercial transaction. General knowledge that there is an accumulation of surplus of any market commodity would
undoubtedly tend to diminish production, but the dissemination of that information cannot in itself be said to be restraint upon commerce in any legal sense. The
manufacturer is free to produce, but prudence and business foresight based on that
knowledge influence free choice in favor of more limited production. Restraint upon
free competition begins when improper use is made of that information through any
concerted action which operates to restrain the freedom of action of those who buy

and sell.
Id. at 583.
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rule is employed.4" The Supreme Court has declared certain
activities, including agreements to fix prices, anathema to the free
trade market and has held those activities per se violations of the
Sherman Act. 3 When faced with per se illegality, the Court has
refused to consider what just or honorable ends the restraint may
serve." So long as there is an agreement to fix prices or activity from
which such an agreement may be inferred, competition is presumed
restrained regardless of how beneficial the activity may be to the
5
public interest.1
In United States v. NationalAssociation of Real Estate Boards,"
the Court considered a situation closely analagous to Goldfarb. The
Washington Real Estate Board's membership included all the licensed real estate brokers in the Washington, D.C. area. As a requirement for licensing, the members subscribed to the Board's
code of ethics which provided: "Brokers should maintain the standard rates of commission adopted by the board and no business
should be solicited at lower rates."' 7 Since the Washington Board
never imposed sanctions for departure from the rate schedule, the
district court exonerated the defendants and termed the prescribed
rates "nonmandatory."" On appeal the Supreme Court reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas noted that "subtle influences may be just as
effective as the threat or use of formal sanctions to hold people in
line.""
Price-fixing is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade. It is not
for the courts to determine whether in particular settings pricefixing serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown
either by adherence to a price schedule or by proof of consensual
action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is itself illegal under
the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to serve. 0
42. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
43. See, e.g., United States v. National Associations of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485,
489 (1950) (price fixing); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying
arrangements); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott). But see Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S.
341 (1963) (group boycott under federal regulatory scheme).
44. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
45. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
46. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
47. Id. at 488.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 489.
50. Id. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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In concluding that there was an agreement to fix prices, the Court
in Real Estate Boards relied heavily on the fact that the Washington
Real Estate Board's members complied strictly with the fixed commission rates and did in fact act in concert to promote uniform price
levels."
The Supreme Court in Goldfarb followed the reasoning of the
Real Estate Boards decision and held that the minimum fee schedule was not "advisory," but a classic price fixing scheme.52 Faced
with what it considered an agreement by attorneys to unabashedly
adhere to a minimum fee schedule, the Court saw little need to
explore the purpose or effect of the activities. Furthermore, the fee
schedule was an agreement enforced "through the prospective professional discipline from the State Bar" and a desire to respond to
professional responsibilities.5 3 In addition, "the motivation to conform was reinforced by the assurance that other lawyers would not
compete by underbidding."54
Once the Court determined that the minimum fee schedule operated as a price-fixing combination in restraint of trade, the County
Bar could not invoke either the Parker v. Brown exemption55 or the
extenuating and mitigating aspects of the professional legal code."
In short, the County Bar was denied rule of reason benefit because
the minimum fee schedule operated as a commercial agreement to
fix price levels and influence consumer transactions in restraint of
trade .51
Per se illegality in the context of Goldfarb means that the mere
existence of a minimum fee schedule enforced under the semblance
of disciplinary authority will be construed as an agreement to fix
prices in violation of the Sherman Act no matter what legitimate
51. 339 U.S. at 489. See generally Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price Fixing: A Per Se Violation of The
Sherman Act, 22 AM. U. L. REv. 439 (1973).

52. 95 S.Ct. at 2011. See Arnould, PricingProfessionalServices: A Case Study of the Legal
Service Industry, supra note 31.
53.

95 S.Ct. at 2010.

54. Id.
55. See text accompanying notes 104 through 121 infra.
56. See BNA ANTrruST & TRADE ReG. REP., No. 707 at A-4-10 (1975); Remarks of Deputy
Ass't Att'y Gen. Bruce B. Wilson, BNA ANTrrUs'r & TRAE REG. REP., No. 720, at A-7 (1975)
where he comments: "[U]nder a rule of reason analysis, it seems highly unlikely that all
restrictions on advertising by professionals would be deemed illegal once balanced against the
potential harm to society that certain forms of advertising could have." See also Zimroth,
Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YLE L.J. 966 (1967).
57. See also United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), where the Supreme
Court held that in the absence of any intent to create a monopoly, a private manufacturer
may exercise his discretion as to with whom he deals.
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professional aims the schedule seeks to promote. The appropriateness of the per se rule to the minimum fee schedule is not completely
unequivocal." However, the weight of authority supports the rule's
application to an agreement in restraint of trade resulting from a
bar association's promulgation of a minimum fee schedule. Hence,
as a device for effectively fostering professional responsibility, the
fee schedule is discredited and severely limited. In future minimum
fee schedule challenges under the Sherman Act, professional organizations will be precluded from raising the mitigating aspects of their
ethics codes unless it is impossible to infer from their activities an
agreement to engage in anticompetitive price fixing. Insofar as attorneys, absent an agreement, use price information for legitimate
purposes, the Goldfarb decision does not reach the bona fide "suggested" fee schedule. The distinction between unilateral action and
the per se violation is apparent. It is only where the bar association
enforces a minimum fee schedule under the threat of professional
retribution that an agreement by member attorneys constitutes illegal price fixing.
EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE

When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, Congress intended
to exercise all the power it commanded under the commerce
clause. 9 In the last quarter century, this power has dramatically
expanded. Supreme Court decisions in National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.10 and United States v.
1 announced
Darby,"
the "affectation" doctrine of the commerce
power. Congress may reach activities that either occur within the
flow of interstate commerce, or substantially and adversely affect
the free flow of interstate commerce. 2 In United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association,3 the Supreme Court took the
position that the Sherman Act has a similarly broad reach. 4 The
58. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357-61 (1963). See
generally P. AREEDA, ANrTITUST ANALYSIS 1. §§107-35 (2d ed. 1974).
59. See generally Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932);
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945). See also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) for an overview of the recent history of the commerce power.
60. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
61. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
62. See generally Light, The FederalCommerce Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 717 (1963); Kallis,
Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L.J. 236. For a more detailed delineation of
this two pronged analysis see 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§5.01 (1969).
63. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
64. Id. at 547.

19761

Antitrust Laws

Goldfarb Court, in light of these historical developments, 5 applied
a relatively expansive interpretation of the test in determining
whether local legal services affect interstate commerce.06
The Court's broad interpretation was not without opposition. The
Fairfax County Bar Association contended that the nexus between
interstate commerce and the fee schedule's restraint on legal services was too incidental and remote to sustain jurisdiction. 7 On oral
argument, counsel for the County Bar insisted:
[flt is clear that this case only involves residents of Virginia,
who wanted a Virginia home, and went to a Virginia attorney, who
examined a Virginia land title. The transaction was closed in Virginia, and the money to finance the transaction all came from a
Virginia savings and loan association. 8
In addition, the County Bar contended that, as a practical matter,
there was no showing that the fee schedule and its enforcement
activities deterred prospective home buyers or raised fees. It also
argued lawyering is principally a local activity not in trade or commerce and the failure to show direct economic impact on interstate
commerce defeats federal jurisdiction and Sherman Act application."

In United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.,70 producers, distributors and retailers had conspired to fix and maintain retail
prices of alcoholic beverages shipped into a state. The defendants
argued that their conduct was outside the parameters of the Sherman Act because the price fixing applied only to retail sales which
were wholly intrastate and that the state's police power preempted
Sherman Act application in essentially local activities. Speaking in
terms of "conduct wholly within a state and conduct which is an
inseparable element of a larger program dependent for its success
upon activity which affects commerce between the states," 7 ' the
65. See, e.g., Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219 (1948).
66. 95 S.Ct. at 2011. Chief Justice Burger noted: "It is in a practical sense that we must
view an effect on interstate commerce." Id. at n.ll.
67. Id.
68. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 707, at A-5 (1975).
69. 95 S.Ct. at 2011. The County Bar relied on United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947), in support of their argument, which proved to be ill-advised since the Court found
that "it would be more apt to compare the legal services here with a taxi trip between stations
to change trains in the midst of an interstate journey. In Yellow Cab we held that such a trip
was a part of the stream of commerce." Id. at n.13.
70. 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
71. Id. at 297.

264

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

Court found the requisite jurisdictional basis in that the methods
adopted in fixing prices reached beyond the boundaries of the state.
Therefore, even indirect combinations restraining activities in interstate commerce are prohibited by the Sherman Act.7" Frankfort
Distilleries unequivocally rejected the "direct" and "indirect" test
of the commerce power to local activites under federal antitrust
laws.
The Goldfarb Court faced two questions in regards to the commerce issue. First, were the legal services an integral part of an
interstate transaction; second, did the minimum fee schedule substantially and adversely affect interstate transactions?
In the district court,. the findings of fact indicated that large
amounts of the funds furnished to purchase homes in Fairfax
County came from outside the State. Nearly all the out-of-state
lending institutions required a title examination by an attorney.
The lower court also pointed out that a significant number of Fairfax County residents were employed outside the State of Virginia.
In addition, federal agencies based in the District of Columbia guaranteed a large number of mortgages in Fairfax County."
Where the mortgagee conducting an interstate financial transaction requires legal services as a necessary part of that transaction,
the legal services are in interstate commerce. In Goldfarb, the
Court held there was ample justification for holding that lawyers'
services in the examination of a title sustain Sherman Act jurisdiction. In a class action, where interstate transactions create a need
for particular legal services, those legal services, in themselves,
occur in the flow of interstate commerce. 5
72.

Id. at 298. Mr. Justice Black succinctly stated for the Court:
Whatever was the ultimate object of this conspiracy, the means adopted for its
accomplishment reached beyond the boundaries of Colorado. The combination
concerned itself with the type of contract used in making interstate sales; its coercive power was used to compel the producers of alcoholic beverages outside of
Colorado to enter into price-maintenance contracts. . .. The power of retailers to
coerce out-of-state producers can be just as effectively exercised through pressure
brought to bear upon wholesalers as though the retailers brought such pressure to
bear directly upon the producers.

Id.
73. 95 S.Ct. at 2011.
74. Id. at 2012. Compare Goldfarb'streatment of the "flow of interstate commerce" theory
with "substantial affect" theory in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The
Goldfarb Court suggests that the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act are met
under either theory where the services are an integral part of the transaction. 95 S.Ct. at 2012.
75. 95 S.Ct. at 2012. In United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U.S. 186
(1954), the Supreme Court held that the interstate commerce requirement of the antitrust
laws was satisfied even though the restraint was merely a consequence of attempts to monopolize local trade.
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The more difficult question the Court considered was whether the
minimum fee schedule substantially and adversely affected commerce among the states. The court of appeals considered only the
"affecting commerce" theory and held the nexus between the real
estate transaction in interstate commerce and the minimum fee
schedule too remote and insubstantial to sustain Sherman Act jurisdiction. In reversing, the Court held that if the financing institutions require title examination as a condition of financing, the cost
of the legal services constitutes a significant part of the purchase.
When the minimum fee schedule acts as a restraint on this cost,
interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected.7" Also, it is immaterial whether or not there was a showing that real estate buyers
were discouraged by the bar groups' activities. Since no special
magnitude need be shown," the fact that the cost of the title examination constitutes a portion of the purchase price is sufficient.
The Court limited its inquiry into the relationships between the
cost of the service and the minimum fee schedule because whether
a given system of restraints "affects" interstate commerce is essentially a question of fact determined at the district court level." Also,
the question of whether the fee schedule raised fees is moot in light
of the Court's holding that the minimum fee schedule is a pricefixing device illegal per se under the Sherman Act.79 Such violations
presume an adverse affect on price levels. s° Consequently, the Goldfarbs were under no duty to show the minimum fee schedule's direct
economic consequences under section 1.
"LEARNED PROFESSION"

EXEMPTION

Bar associations can no longer claim that publishing and enforcing minimum fee schedules is immune from antitrust statutes under
the so-called "learned profession" doctrine.8 ' The County Bar had
76.

95 S.Ct. at 2012.
The necessary connection between the interstate transactions and the restraint of
trade provided by the minimum fee schedule is present because, in a practical
sense, title examinations are necessary in real estate transactions to assure a lien
on a valid title of the borrower. In financing realty purchases lenders require, "as a
condition of making the loan, that the title to the property involved be examined.
... Thus a title examination is an integral part of an interstate transaction.
Id. at 2011.
77. See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956).
78. Cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 331-32 (1952).
79. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (1940).
80. Cf. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 489
(1950). See Eastern States Lumber Association v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1914).
81. 95 S.Ct. at 2012-14. See generally Note, Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and Minimum Legal Fee Schedules, Learned Professions and State Action Immunity, 53 N.C.L.REv.
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argued in Goldfarb that Congress never intended to include the
"learned professions" within the trade and commerce clause of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The bar group contended that professional services are non-commercial, and serve the interests of the
community. Furthermore, the minimum fee schedule fosters professional responsibility and has an essentially non-commercial purpose.8
The Goldfarb Court rejected these contentions outright, finding
no federal statute or legislative history expressly exempting the
legal profession from the scope of the antitrust laws. The basis of
the historical exemption is the belief that the practice of law does
not constitute "trade or commerce" within the dimensions of the
Sherman Act.8 3 In general, all the "learned professions" have at

some point adopted this position.8 It is based on the negative inference that if the Sherman Act specifically controls "trade or commerce" any activity outside "trade or commerce" was not intended
to be included in section 1.s1
As Goldfarb rightly concluded, this inference is based on neither
logic nor precedent. The nature of a man's profession, standing
alone, does not shield him from the Sherman Act. In Associated
6 the Court confronted a situation where the
Press v. United States,"
Associated Press contracted with a Canadian press association to
furnish news exclusively to each other thereby excluding their competitors. In holding this activity a restraint of trade and in violation
of the Sherman Act, the Court found that the members of the Associated Press, no less than manufacturers who sell commodities, were
399, 401-05 (1974); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules v. Antitrust: The Goldfarb Affair,
supra note 18, at 170-73.
The Illinois Antitrust Act is an excellent example of a legislative exemption for the "learned
professions" from state antitrust laws. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §60-5 (1973) provides:
No provisions of this Act shall be construed to make illegal:
(12). . . .the activities of any bona fide not-for-profit association, society or board,
of attorneys, practitioners of medicine, architects, engineers, land surveyors or real
estate brokers licensed and regulated by an agency of the State of Illinois, in
recommending schedules of suggested fees, rates or commissions for use solely as
guidelines in determining chargesfor professional and technical services (emphasis
added).
82. 95 S.Ct. at 2012-13. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense,
56 Nw. U. L. REv. 705 (1962).
83. See, e.g., United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485,
491-92 (1950); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
84. See Note, Antitrust Law: An Application of the Sherman Act to the Professions,supra
note 5.
85. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931).
86. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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engaged in business for profit.87 The fact that the publisher provides
a public service generally in the public interest does not afford him
sanctuary "in which he can with impunity violate laws regulating
his business practice." 88 The scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act
is as broad as Congress' commerce power. Therefore, to judicially
legislate an exemption is inconsistent with the distribution of powers under the tripartite system of government. 9
Judicial legislation of exemptions under the federal antitrust laws
was explored in detail in Radovich v. National Football League. 0
Radovich involved a Sherman Act challenge brought by a former
professional football player against the National Football League.
He claimed the league conspired to deny him freedom of contract
and the right to organize an independent league in competition with
the National Football League. The courts below dismissed his complaint on the basis of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs" and Toolson v.
New York Yankees, Inc. ,"which held that professional baseball was
not trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Recognizing no logical basis for exempting professional sports, the
Court nevertheless held that so long as Congress acquiesces to the
Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions those rulings will be adhered to as stare decisis,93 but they will not be extended beyond
baseball. Thus, except for baseball, professional sports teams engage in sufficient interstate commerce to invoke the Sherman Act. 4
It is the sale of professional services that is considered to be trade
and commerce within the meaning of section 1. The Court has therefore placed a heavy burden on the party claiming immunity under
federal antitrust statutes where Congress has not expressly exempted the activities in issue. 5
The County Bar also argued that though Congress never expressly
exempted the "learned professions" from the scope of the antitrust
87. Id. at 7.
88. id.
89. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
90. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
91. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
92. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
93. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957). See Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
94. 352 U.S. at 449. See Haywood v. National Basketball Association, 401 U.S. 1204
(1971)(basketball does not enjoy the exemption from the antitrust laws).
95. California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1962); United States
v. First City National Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967).
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laws, there has been judicial recognition of a limited exclusion for
the professions. 6 Goldfarb rejects this contention. Previously the
Court had specifically avoided the problem professional services
pose to antitrust laws. 7
The Court acknowledged that the case at bar was its first attempt
at deciding whether the "learned professions" are exempt from the
Sherman Act. Commentators have noted that the obiter dicta cited
by the County Bar in support of the "learned profession" exemption
were of no particular relevance to the issues confronting the Court
in Goldfarb."'
The Court had observed prior to the Goldfarb decision that the
distribution of legal services, like the distribution of goods, is generally controlled by the dynamics of private enterprise and economic
intercourse." The lawyer offers his knowledge, expertise and experience in exchange for monetary compensation. Acknowledging this,
Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated:
It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to
acknowledge that it has this business aspect, and §1 of the Sherman Act "[oln its face shows a carefully studied attempt to bring
within the Act every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the
states."10
Under this rationale, the Court held that the examination of a land
title by an attorney in return for money is an exchange of a service
for compensation, and thus commerce in the most traditional sense
of the term. 0' Absent an express congressional pronouncement or
"state action" under Parker v. Brown,102 the commercial activities
96. See Note, Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and Minimum Legal Fee Schedules:
Learned Professions and State Action Immunity, supra note 81, at 401-05.
97. American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943); Federal
Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
98. See, e.g., Note, Minimum Fee Schedules-The Battle and the War: Goldfarb at the
Fourth Circuit, supra note 30, at 1430-34; Note, Antitrust Law-The Sherman Act and
Minimum Legal Fee Schedules: Learned Professions and State Action Immunity, supra note
81, at 402-05. See generally Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
99. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53 (1974).
100. 95 S.Ct. at 2013, citing United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S.
533, 553 (1944).
101. Id. But compare Justice Story's remarks in The Nymph, 18 F.Cas. 506-07 (No.
10,388) (C.C.D.Me. 1834) where he states:
Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of
profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions,
it is constantly called a trade.
102. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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of lawyers are within the "trade or commerce" clause of section 1
03
of the Sherman Act.1
STATE ACTION EXEMPTION

In Parker v. Brown, 04 the Supreme Court held that where the
state directs private persons to engage in activities in restraint of
trade, the federal antitrust laws may not reach that activity. Parker
involved a Sherman Act challenge to an agricultural marketing plan
under the California Agriculture Prorate Act. 05 The legislature
adopted the program to restrict raisin production in the state in
order to maintain price levels. 06 Under the statutory scheme, the
governor appointed members to a public plan commission. This
commission conducted hearings on the economic feasibility of local
quota programs. The commission would review a tentative plan and
send it to a committee of citizens from the affected area. That
committee would then formulate the details and, together with its
recommendations, return the program to the commission for its
approval. In addition, the raisin producers were required to review
and approve the specific program. Once the marketing plan was
adopted, it was binding on the producers under penalty of law." 7
The Court considered these activities "state action" and immune
from the Sherman Act. While the Parker decision provided no
meaningful guidelines for determining what kinds of private activities are protected, the Court stressed that the restraints were implemented at the direction of the state. It is not enough that the public
benefits from the activity, or that the activity was supervised by the
state, or that it receives its efficacy from the state. The legislature
must command the restraint of trade, not simply condone it. °s
This distinction was recognized by the Fourth Circuit in Asheville
Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.09
Asheville Tobacco involved a marketing scheme whereby a group of
tobacco warehousemen, the Asheville Board of Trade, Inc., entered
103. 95 S.Ct. at 2014.
104. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
105. Id. at 346-47.
106. Id. at 350-52.
107. Id. at 347-49.
108. Id. at 350.
109. 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). But see Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 1971) where the Fourth Circuit held that the
potential for state regulation satisfies the "state action" requirement of Parker. The Fifth
Circuit in Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972), expressly rejects the Washington Gas Light reasoning and returned to the "meaningful regulation" standard adopted in Goldfarb.
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into an agreement to govern the allotment of floor selling time by
limiting new warehouse construction. Warehouse selling time was
alloted on the basis of square footage of warehouse space. Several
weeks after the agreement was adopted, one member submitted
plans for the building of a new warehouse designed to capture 25
percent of the floor selling time. In response to this challenge, the
Board of Trade modified its by-laws effectively excluding the challenger. After unsuccesful litigation in the state courts, the renegade
member complained to the Federal Trade Commission."10 The Commission found that the challenged activities were an unreasonable
restraint of trade contrary to the public's interest and in violation
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."' The Commission entered a cease and desist order. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
remanded to the Federal Trade Commission for further findings of
fact. However, in order to settle the jurisdictional issue, the court
explored the application of the Parker doctrine to the activities of
the Board of Trade. The issue was whether the activities particularly in regard to the modification of the by-laws, constituted actions of state officers and agents. North Carolina law had provided
for some private activities in the regulation of the tobacco industry.
After examining the applicable statutes, the court of appeals concluded that these private activities were merely condoned since the
legislature nowhere directed the Board of Trade to adopt regulations
in restraint of trade."2 The court held that the Parker exemption
protects state action not "individual action masquerading as state
action.""1'3 The court further held that state action, here, was limited
to the statutory requirement that the boards of trade adopt just
regulations not restricting the tobacco trade or commerce, and legal
decisions on controversies arising among the board members." 4
Conceding this point, the Virginia State Bar nevertheless argued
that the legislature, in authorizing the Virginia Supreme Court to
regulate the practice of law in the state, had directed the State Bar,
as the supreme court's agent, to enforce the disciplinary code. Since
the ethical opinions and fee schedule reports serve to enforce the
110. Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 263 F.2d 502,
507 (4th Cir. 1959).
111. Id. See 15 U.S.C. §45 (1970).
112. Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 263 F.2d 502
(4th Cir. 1959). See Note, State Action Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U. L. REV.
393 (1970).
113. Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 263 F.2d 502,
509 (4th Cir. 1959).
114. Id. at 510.
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group contended that their activities comdisciplinary code, the bar
5
prised "state action.""1
The question the Goldfarb Court confronted was whether these
activities were required by Virginia acting as a sovereign. To merit
the Parker exemption, the Virginia legislature must have either
expressed the opinion that minimum fee schedules are in the best
interest of the state, or enacted a statutory scheme necessarily calling for the fee schedule. Virginia Code section 54-48 ' ' 1 grants the
Virginia Supreme Court the power to prescribe the code of ethics
and disciplinary rules applicable to Virginia attorneys. There is no
suggestion in the Virginia Code that minimum fee schedules or
anticompetitive activities of lawyers are in the state's interest. Virginia Code section 54-49I7 stipulates that the supreme court may
95 S.Ct. at 2014. On oral argument, counsel for the Virginia State Bar asserted:
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is an administrative agency of the State
of Virginia, and the Court has adopted rules on the Virginia State Bar, to which
all Virginia attorneys must belong. By statute, the Virginia Legislature authorized
the court to organize the Virginia State Bar to act as an administrative agency of
the court to relieve the court of the burden of day-to-day supervision and regulation
of all Virginia attorneys. The Virginia State Bar has authority from the Virginia
Supreme Court to issue advisory ethical opinions, to analyze existing minimum fee
schedules, and to ascertain the fairness of fees. Now, while it is true that any state
action whatever does not automatically provide an exemption under Parker v.
Brown, it is clear that the Virginia State Bar qualifies as an arm of the state under
Parker, by virtue of its mandate from the Virginia Legislature and its mandate from
the Virginia Supreme Court. . . .The State Bar did not undertake to set minimum
fee schedules for the entire state as a whole. All the Virginia Bar did was analyze
local versions and variations in them, and prepare reports showing these variations
and analyzing them, which were made available to local bars. True, the Virginia
Supreme Court has not required that schedules be adopted, nor has the State Bar
required local bars to adopt the schedules.
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 707, at A-7 (1975)(emphasis added).
116. VA. CODE ANN. §54-48 (1972) provides:
Rules and regulations defining practice of law and prescribing codes of ethics and
disciplinary procedure.-The Supreme Court of Appeals may, from time to time,
prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and regulations:
(a) Defining the practice of law.
(b) Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys
at law and a code of judicial ethics.
(c) Prescribing procedure for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys
at law.
117. VA. CODE ANN. §54-49 (1972) provides:
Organization and government of Virginia State Bar.-The Supreme Court of
Appeals may, from time to time, prescribe, adopt, promulgate and amend rules and
regulations of organizing and governing the association known as the Virginia State
Bar, composed of the attorneys at law of this State, to act as an administrative
agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting the violation of
such rules and regulations as are adopted by the Court under this article to a court
of competent jurisdiction for such proceedings as may be necessary, and requiring
all persons practicing law in this State to be members thereof in good standing,
115.
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provide rules and regulations for the governing of the Virginia State
Bar to act as its administrative arm in enforcing the disciplinary
code. The disciplinary rules provide some guidance in establishing
"reasonable fees" and "suggested" fee schedules. No mention is
made that the state's interest is fostered by promoting anticompetitive practices within the legal profession. No legitimate state aim
is advanced in support of price fixing through the use of minimum
fee schedules. Perhaps the Virginia Supreme Court, in approving
the ethical opinions of the State Bar, condoned the use of the fee
schedules. But as Goldfarb correctly surmised, it cannot be said
that the State of Virginia or the supreme court, arguably an alter
ego of the State, required the promulgation or enforcement of the
minimum fee schedules or the anticompetitive activities of its lawyers."' For the Parker exemption to control, the state must be more
than peripherally involved."'
Goldfarb imposed liability on the State Bar precisely because it
was in pari delicto with the County Bar in the practice of maintaining the efficacy of the minimum fee schedule.' 21 Without the State
Bar's ethical opinions and its concurrent disciplinary power to enforce adherence, the bar associations' fee schedules may well have
been "suggested," and the issues before the Court would have been
very different. Since the Virginia State Bar participated in private,
discretionary antitrust violations, it can claim no talismanic immunity from the Sherman Act by reliance upon Parker v. Brown. 2 '
IMPACT

The ramifications of Goldfarb extend beyond its treatment of the
minimum fee schedule as a price fixing scheme. The decision is
important for establishing the jurisdictional framework for future
antitrust lawsuits against learned professions. Of course, the success
of these challenges will depend in large measure on how strictly the
Goldfarb Court's treatment of the commerce question is held to the
facts. Clearly the Chief Justice was not unequivocal in deciding that
118. 95 S.Ct. at 2015. See also, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28,
at F-4.
119. 95 S.Ct. at 2015. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 28,
at F-3.
120. 95 S.Ct. at 2015. The Court stated:
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not
create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the
benefit of its members.
Id.
121. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384 (1951).
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legal services affect interstate commerce. 22 For the most part, the
Court left the task of determining whether particular legal services
affect interstate commerce to future case-by-case analysis. Although the Court provided no useful guidelines for determining this
issue in other circumstances, it emphasized that the historical antitrust approach to the commerce clause is well suited for cases of this
23
nature.
The potential significance of Goldfarb will in all probability lie in
its abandonment of the "learned profession" exemption. Notwithstanding expressed exceptions, anticompetitive activities, even
among learned professions are illegal under the antitrust statutes.
An additional implication of Goldfarb's recognition that the activities of lawyers may be trade or commerce under the Sherman Act
is that the professions are now subject to the historical developments and policy of the antitrust laws. In this regard, Chief Justice
Burger expressed a caveat in a footnote:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any other
24
situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
The Court acknowledged that the Parkerv. Brown exemption still
protects anticompetitive state action:
[Tihe States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power
to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they
have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners
and regulating the practice of professions. . . .In holding that
122.

95 S.Ct. at 2012:
Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are an integral part
of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services may substantially affect
commerce for Sherman Act purposes. Of course, there may be legal services that
involve interstate commerce in other fashions, just as there may be legal services
that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2013.
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certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of
the Sherman Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the
State to regulate its professions.' u
A legislature could then provide a mandate for the state and local
bar associations by passing a statute demanding lawyers to adopt
minimum fee schedules.' 2 6 Goldfarb, however, restricts this
exemption to "anticompetitive activities . . .compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign." '27
In recognizing that the public is entitled to the benefits of price
competition among lawyers, Goldfarb indirectly raised the problem
of legal advertising. While the government stressed that fee advertising was not an issue in Goldfarb, the question arises whether
there is "any reason to deny the . . . client-consumers the very sort
of specific fee information that they would need . . . to gain the
benefits of . . .price competition?"'2 8 The American Bar Association, under pressure from the Justice Department, adopted new
amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically
permitting prepaid and group legal services to use dignified commercial advertising, "which does not identify any lawyer by name,
to describe the availability or nature of its legal services or legal
service benefits.' 21 9 Recently, a solo practitioner challenged the general ban on advertising in a Sherman Act suit against The Association of the Bar of the City of New York and other agencies. 30 In
addition to the antitrust count, the action seeks recourse under the
Civil Rights Act, 3 ' the first amendment,' and the fourteenth
amendment. 33 The probable outcome of this suit and similar actions will be the striking of a balance between the need to
protect the public and the need to give them all of the information
125.

Id. at 2016.

126.

The Virginia Antitrust Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§59.1-9.1 et seq. (1974) at §59.1-9.4(1),
contains an exemption for activities of bar associations and its members that are directed to
professional objectives.
127. 95 S.Ct. at 2015.
128. Comment, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 707, at A-9 (1975).
129. Id. at A-10, citing ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR2-101(B); see Comment, Advertising, Solicitation, and PrepaidLegal Services, 40 TENN. L. REv. 439, 441-49
(1973).
130. Person v. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, No. 75 C 987
(E.D.N.Y., filed June 23, 1975), as reported in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 720,
at A-8 (1975). See Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and
Advertising, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CWV. LIB. L. REV. 77 (1973); Note, Advertising, Solicitation
and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).

131. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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relevant to access to the legal system. . . .But that balance must
be struck as part of the broader effort to make legal services available to all who need them regardless of economic or social status.'3 4

One commentator has suggested that "lilt is not the immediate
result of Goldfarb but rather. . . its ramifications and implications
that now assume importance."' 3 5 By forsaking the rule of reason and
holding that the attorneys' minimum fee schedule was a price fixing
agreement, the Supreme Court has sounded the death knell of fee
schedules in the learned professions. In addition, the decision reinforces the recent Justice Department activities against other professions.' 6 Moreover, on a practical basis, Goldfarb illustrates the
pressing need within the legal profession to re-examine the legal and
moral foundations of its ethical standards in light of the abuses
which have occurred. Traditionally, the legal community has justified its professional code not on the basis that it benefits lawyers but
rather on the basis it benefits society.' 37 However, continued abuse
of the self-regulation privilege at the public's expense invites intrusion by those less sympathetic to a lawyer's interests.' 8 The response of the legal profession to the Goldfarb challenge will demon134. Comment, SolicitationBy the Second Oldest Profession:Attorneys and Advertising,
supra note 130, at 103. See Remarks of Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. Bruce B. Wilson, supra note
56.
135. Opinion & Comment, From Goldfarb to Where, 61 A.B.A.J. 965 (1975).
136. The Justice Department has obtained consent decrees for alleged fee fixing antitrust
violations against professions. See, e.g., United States v. American Society of Civil Engineers,
Civil No. 72-1776 (S.D.N.Y., June 1, 1972), 1972 Trade Cas. 73,950; United States v.
American Institute of Architects, Civil No. 992-72 (D.D.C., June 19, 1972), 1972 Trade Cas.
73,981; United States v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., Civil
No. 1091-72 (D.D.C., July 6, 1972), 1972 Trade Cas. 74,007. The Justice Department recently challenged the "relative value guides" of the American Society of Anesthesiologists in
an antitrust suit filed September 22, 1975, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. United States v. American Society of Anesthesiologists, No. 754640 (S.D.N.Y., filed September 22, 1975), as reported in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.,
No. 732, at A-16 (1975).
137. President's Page, supra note 33, at 1050.
138. One example of the tremendous disparity in legal costs caused by the minimum fee
schedule is the situation of the Goldfarbs. A title search by a Virginia attorney cost the
Goldfarbs $522.50. Had they been able to obtain a title examination by a Washington, D.C.
lawyer searching the same property but not "bound" by the fee schedule, the cost would have
been $80. Paulson, Title Search Fees, National Observer, July 19, 1975, at 9, col. 1. Solicitor
General Bork sums up the dilemma: "It is true that some cite professional ethics; but one
searches in vain for any connection between professional ethics and price-fixing, and one
searches in vain for the principle that price-fixing is ethical." BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP., No. 707, at A-4 (1975).

276

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

strate whether it still has the capacity to subordinate financial
reward to social responsibility.'3 9
MICHAEL SENNETT

139. For a suggestion of the possible retroactive ramifications of the Goldfarb decision on
state bar associations that practiced anticompetitive activities through the use of fee schedules but have since abandoned them, see United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286,
295 (1970) and Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971).

